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Summary
It has been proposed that there be a domain on the Internet exclusively for
websites that contain sexually explicit material; it might be labeled “.xxx” to
complement the current “.com,” “.org,” and others.  Some propose making use of a
“.xxx” domain voluntary, but others propose that Congress make it mandatory.  The
latter proposal raises the question whether a mandatory separate domain would
violate the First Amendment, and this report focuses on that question.
It is unclear whether making a “.xxx” domain mandatory would violate the First
Amendment.  Whether it would be constitutional might depend upon whether a court
viewed it as a content-based restriction on speech or as analogous to the zoning of
adult theaters, or even as a mere disclosure requirement that did not raise a significant
First Amendment issue.  If a court viewed it as a content-based restriction on speech,
then it would be constitutional only if the court found that it served a compelling
governmental interest by the least restrictive means.  Other factors that could affect
its constitutionality might be whether it imposed criminal penalties and whether it
were limited to websites that are predominantly pornographic.
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Constitutionality of Requiring Sexually
Explicit Material on the Internet to be Under
a Separate Domain Name
Proposals for a Voluntary “.xxx” Domain
It has been proposed that there be a domain on the Internet exclusively for
Websites that contain sexually explicit material; it might be labeled “.xxx” to
complement the current “.com,” “.org,” and others.  Some propose making use of a
“.xxx” domain voluntary, but others propose that Congress make it mandatory.  The
latter proposal raises the question whether a mandatory separate domain would
violate the First Amendment, and this report focuses on that question.
Congress has already provided for a “.kids” domain: the Dot Kids
Implementation and Efficiency Act of 2002 directs the National Telecommunication
and Information Administration (NTIA), which is an agency in the Department of
Commerce, to establish a “new domain” “that provides access only to material that
is suitable for minors and not harmful to minors.”1  The URL for the new domain is
[http://www.kids.us], and that site lists 22 websites that use the new domain.
An article reports that chairman and president of ICM Registry Inc., “Stuart
Lawley, a Florida entrepreneur, [is] trying to establish a pornography-only ‘.xxx’
domain.  In such a realm, Lawley could restrict porn marketing to adults only, protect
users’ privacy, limit span and collect fees from Web masters.  The .xxx proposal was
finally slated for approval in August by the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names
and Numbers (Icann), but because of a flurry of protest, it has been shelved for
now.”2  Another article explains that the reason that the proposal has been put off is
that “the Commerce Department sought more time to hear objections [and] ICANN
cannot move forward without Commerce Department approval.”3  
 Both articles comment on support and opposition to the proposal:
The proposal has had its share of critics.  Some of them claim that a .xxx domain
would provide legitimacy to the pornography industry.  Supporters claim that a
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.xxx domain would make it easier for people to filter out content they do not
want.4
The Family Research Council warns that it [the proposal] will simply breed more
smut.  But Senator Joe Lieberman supports a virtual red-light district because he
says it would make the job of filtering out porn easier.
Meanwhile, some pornographers, apparently drawn by the promise of catchier
and more trustworthy U.R.L.’s, have gotten behind Lawley.  Other skin-peddlers,
echoing the A.C.L.U., see the establishment of a voluntary porn zone as the first
step toward the deportation of their industry to a distant corner of the Web,
where their sites could easily be blocked by skittish Internet service providers,
credit card companies and even governments.5
Finally, some anti-pornography advocates oppose the proposal for a voluntary
“.xxx” domain because “sites would be free to keep their current ‘.com’ address in
effect making porn more easily accessible by creating yet another channel to house
it.”6
Constitutionality of a Mandatory “.xxx” Domain
No bill has been introduced in the 109th Congress to create an “.xxx” domain,
but S. 2137, 107th Congress, which was introduced by Senator Landrieu, would have
done so.  Specifically, it would have required “any operator of a commercial Internet
website or online service that has as its principal or primary business the making
available of material that is harmful to minors” — as the bill would have defined that
phrase — to use a new domain that the Secretary of Commerce, acting through the
National Telecommunications and Information Administration, would have been
directed to establish.
The rest of this report will consider the constitutionality of a mandatory “.xxx”
domain, without focusing on S. 2137 or any other particular proposal.  It does not
matter for constitutional purposes specifically how the bill would define the material
that it would require to be in the “.xxx” domain; we will assume merely that such
material would include sexually explicit material that is protected by the First
Amendment.  And all sexually explicit material is generally protected by the First
Amendment, unless it constitutes obscenity, or child pornography that is produced
with an actual minor.7
Content-based discrimination.  To require that websites with sexually
explicit material be under a separate domain name would be to treat such material
differently from other speech, and therefore could be viewed as discriminating
against speech on the basis of its content.  The Supreme Court has said that “[i]t is
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rare that a regulation restricting speech because of its content will ever be
permissible.”8  As a general rule, the Supreme Court will uphold a content-based
speech regulation only if it satisfies “strict scrutiny,” which means only if it is
necessary “to promote a compelling interest” and is “the least restrictive means to
further the articulated interest.”9  By contrast, if a regulation of speech is “justified
without reference to the content of the speech,” then the Supreme Court considers it
“content-neutral” and will uphold it if it “is designed to serve a substantial
governmental interest and allows for reasonable alternative avenues of
communication.”10  In other words, if a regulation of speech has a purpose other than
to protect people from harm that the speech itself might cause, then it stands a better
chance of being found constitutional.
One might argue that, although requiring sexually explicit material to be under
a separate domain name would discriminate against speech on the basis of its content,
that would not be the purpose of the requirement, and the requirement could be
justified without reference to the content of the speech it would regulate.  Its purpose
would arguably be to facilitate parents’ or librarians’ use of filters when children
access the Internet.  It would accomplish this by dividing websites into two categories
— those with sexually explicit material and those without it.  This could be viewed
as analogous to requiring “adult” movie theaters to locate in areas that are zoned for
them.  In City of Renton v. Playtime Theaters, Inc., the Supreme Court upheld such
zoning on the theory that it “is not aimed at the content of the films shown at ‘adult
motion picture theaters,’ but rather at the secondary effects of such theaters on the
surrounding community.”11  “The ordinance by its terms is designed to prevent crime,
protect the city’s retail trade, maintain property values, and generally ‘protec[t] and
preserv[e] the quality of [the city’s] neighborhoods, commercial districts, and the
quality of urban life,’ not to suppress the expression of unpopular views.”12
Analogously, one might argue, to restrict sexually explicit material to a separate
domain name arguably would “zone” certain websites not because of the content of
their speech but to lessen the “secondary effect” of minors’ viewing those websites
without parental approval.  In effect, the proposal, like a zoning ordinance, would
seek to isolate certain material into particular “neighborhoods” in cyberspace, and
assist parents in preventing their children from visiting those “neighborhoods.”
A possibly fatal flaw with this analogy, however, is that, in Renton, the
secondary effects that the zoning ordinance sought to prevent — crime, lowered
property values, and a deterioration in the quality of urban life — were not effects of
viewing the regulated speech itself.  The “.xxx” proposal, by contrast, would
apparently attempt to protect minors from the effects of viewing the regulated speech
itself, and these effects therefore are arguably not “secondary” in the sense that the
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Supreme Court meant in Renton.  The “.xxx” proposal, from this view, would impose
a burden on speech because Congress deems it harmful, and that is not a sufficient
basis on which the government may regulate speech in a manner that affects adults,
unless the regulation satisfies strict scrutiny.13  In Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition,
for example, the Supreme Court struck down a federal statute that banned “virtual”
child pornography and other child pornography produced without the use of an actual
minor, despite various harms that the government claimed that viewing such
pornography could cause, such as “whet[ting] the appetites of pedophiles and
encourag[ing] them to engage in illegal conduct.”14 
Thus, a court might view the “.xxx” proposal either as a content-based
regulation, which is constitutional only if it satisfies strict scrutiny by advancing a
compelling governmental interest by the least restrictive means; or as a content-
neutral regulation, which is constitutional if it advances a substantial governmental
interest and allows for reasonable alternative avenues of communication.  We will
apply these two tests to the “.xxx” proposal, in the sections below titled “Strict
scrutiny” and “Content-neutral scrutiny.”  First, however, we will explain why the
“.xxx” proposal would even raise a free speech issue, in light of the fact that it would
not censor speech.
Compelled speech.  The “.xxx” proposal could be viewed as, in effect,
compelling speech on the part of websites with sexually explicit material.  It would
compel them to identify themselves, through use of a separate domain name, as
containing such material.  In general, it is as unconstitutional for the government to
compel speech as it is for it to censor speech, except in the commercial context.15  In
Riley v. National Federation of the Blind of North Carolina, Inc., a North Carolina
statute required professional fundraisers for charities to disclose to potential donors
the gross percentage of revenues retained in prior charitable solicitations.  The
Supreme Court held this unconstitutional, writing
There is certainly some difference between compelled speech and compelled
silence, but in the context of protected speech, the difference is without
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constitutional significance, for the First Amendment guarantees “freedom of
speech,” a term necessarily comprising the decision of both what to say and what
not to say.16
In Meese v. Keene, however, the Court upheld compelled disclosure in a
noncommercial context.17  This case involved a provision of the Foreign Agents
Registration Act of 1938, which requires that, when an agent of a foreign principal
seeks to disseminate foreign “political propaganda,” he must label such material with
certain information, including his identity, the principal’s identity, and the fact that
he has registered with the Department of Justice.  The material need not state that it
is “political propaganda,” but one agent objected to the statute’s designating material
by that term, which he considered pejorative.  The agent wished to exhibit, without
the required labels, three Canadian films on nuclear war and acid rain that the Justice
Department had determined were “political propaganda.”
In Meese v. Keene, the Supreme Court upheld the statute’s use of the term,
essentially because it considered the term not necessarily pejorative.  On the subject
of compelled disclosure, the Court wrote:
Congress did not prohibit, edit, or restrain the distribution of advocacy materials
. . . .  To the contrary, Congress simply required the disseminators of such
material to make additional disclosures that would better enable the public to
evaluate the import of the propaganda.18 
One might infer from this that compelled disclosure, in a noncommercial
context, gives rise to no serious First Amendment issue, and nothing in the Court’s
opinion would seem to refute this inference.  Thus, it seems impossible to reconcile
this opinion with the Court’s holding a year later in Riley (which did not mention
Meese v. Keene) that, in a noncommercial context, there is no difference of
constitutional significance between compelled speech and compelled silence.
In Meese v. Keene, furthermore, the Court did not mention earlier cases in which
it had struck down laws compelling speech in a noncommercial context.  For
example, in Wooley v. Maynard, the Court struck down a New Hampshire statute
requiring motorists to leave visible on their license plates the motto “Live Free or
Die”19; in West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette, the Court held that a
state may not require children to pledge allegiance to the United States20; and, in
Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, the Court struck down a Florida statute that
required newspapers to grant political candidates equal space to reply to the
newspapers’ criticism and attacks on their record.21
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In any event, if one views the “.xxx” proposal as discriminating on the basis of
content, then one could cite most of the compelled speech cases for the proposition
that the “.xxx” proposal would be unconstitutional unless it can pass strict scrutiny.
But one could cite Meese v. Keene (adapting the above quotation from it) to argue
that the “.xxx” proposal would be constitutional because it would “not prohibit, edit,
or restrain the distribution of [sexually explicit material]. ...  To the contrary,
Congress [would] simply require[ ] the disseminators of such material to make
additional disclosures that would better enable the public to evaluate the [content] of
the [website].”
Strict scrutiny.  If the “.xxx” proposal were viewed as content-based, and not
as constitutional simply by virtue of its similarity to the statute upheld in Meese v.
Keene, then, as noted, it would be subject to “strict scrutiny,” which means that it
would be constitutional only if it is necessary “to promote a compelling interest,” and
is “the least restrictive means to further the articulated interest.”22  
Though the Supreme Court may be becoming less absolute in viewing the
protection of all minors, regardless of age, from all sexual material, to be a
compelling  interest,23 it has never struck down, on the ground that it did not further
a compelling governmental interest, a statute aimed at denying minors access to
sexual material.  Rather, the Court tends to assume the existence of a compelling
governmental interest in denying minors access to pornography and move on to the
“least restrictive means” part of the strict scrutiny test, upholding or striking down
the statute on that issue.  In striking down the part of the Communications Decency
Act of 1996 that banned from the Internet all “indecent” material that was accessible
to minors, the Court wrote:
In order to deny minors access to potentially harmful speech, the CDA
effectively suppresses a large amount of speech that adults have a constitutional
right to receive and to address to one another.  That burden on adult speech is
unacceptable if less restrictive alternatives would be at least as effective in
achieving the legitimate purpose that the statute was enacted to serve.24
The “.xxx” proposal would not suppress speech, but would only compel it to be
under a separate domain name.  But are there less restrictive means by which to
accomplish the “.xxx” proposal’s goal?  We will consider two alternative means.
One alternative might be to make use of the separate domain name voluntary.
The question with respect to this alternative would be whether there would be an
incentive for sexually explicit websites to use a separate domain name voluntarily —
an incentive sufficient to induce enough of them to use a separate domain name so
as to make the proposal as effective as it would be if it compelled them to use a
separate domain name.  An incentive, arguably, is that, just as the proposal would
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make it easier to block websites that use a separate domain name, it might make it
easier to locate websites that use a separate domain name.
In addition, one might argue, a statute could effectively make use of a separate
domain name mandatory only for websites based in the United States, as the U.S.
government does not generally have authority over foreign websites.  Therefore, a
statute that mandated use of a separate domain name would not cover all websites
with sexually explicit material, and this would appear to strengthen the case that
voluntary use of a separate domain name would be as effective as mandatory use.25
A second alternative to the proposal might be one that already exists: the Dot
Kids Implementation and Efficiency Act of 2002, mentioned at the beginning of this
report.  This statute may enable parents who wish to do so to block out all websites
not under the “dot kids” domain name.  If parents used a filter to prevent their
children from gaining access to any website that does not use the “dot kids” domain,
then they would be denying their children access to much material on the Internet that
is not sexually explicit.  If one deems a purpose of both the “Dot Kids” statute and
the “.xxx” proposal to be not only to deny children access to sexually explicit
material, but not to deny them access to non-sexually explicit material, then the “Dot
Kids” Act might be viewed as less effective than the “.xxx” proposal, and therefore
as not an adequate alternative to the latter.  But, in another respect, the “Dot Kids”
statute could be more effective because it could enable parents to block foreign as
well as domestic websites; in that respect it might be viewed as an adequate
alternative to the “.xxx” proposal.
Content-neutral scrutiny.  If a court were to find the “.xxx” proposal to be
analogous to the zoning of “adult” theaters that the Supreme Court has upheld, then
it would ask whether the proposal is designed to serve a substantial governmental
interest and allows for reasonable alternative avenues of communication.  Because
it appears that a court would likely find the proposal to serve a “compelling” interest,
a court would ipso facto likely find the proposal to meet the less rigorous test of
serving a “substantial” interest.  And, because the proposal would not prevent anyone
from posting protected speech, but would merely require them to post some speech
under a separate domain name, it apparently could not even be said to reduce their
avenues of communication except insofar as Internet users chose to block websites
that used the separate domain name.  Though the proposal would presumably
facilitate such blocking, it would not require it, and therefore would seem likely to
be found constitutional if this less-than-strict-scrutiny test were applied. 
Criminal penalties.  A factor that might make a difference to the “.xxx”
proposal’s constitutionality is whether it imposed criminal penalties; if it did, that
might tip the balance toward making it unconstitutional.  In Reno v. American Civil
Liberties Union, the Supreme Court, in striking down the Communications Decency
Act of 1996, was apparently influenced by the fact that the statute would have
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imposed criminal penalties, including imprisonment.26  It distinguished Federal
Communications Commission v. Pacifica Foundation, in which it had upheld the ban
on “indecent” material on broadcast media, in part on the ground that the radio
station that had broadcast George Carlin’s “Filthy Words” monologue had been
penalized with only a Federal Communications Commission declaratory order.27
“[T]he Commission’s declaratory order,” the Court in Reno wrote, “was not punitive;
we expressly refused to decide whether the indecent broadcast ‘would justify a
criminal prosecution.’”28
Breadth of the requirement.  Another factor that might make a difference
to the “.xxx” proposal’s constitutionality is whether it applied only to websites that
contained predominantly pornographic material, or it applied to any posting of
material that fit whatever definition the proposal used to define material that  was
required to be under the “.xxx” domain name.  The latter approach would seem more
problematic from a constitutional standpoint because it would effectively bar all
websites not under the “.xxx” domain name from ever posting material that was
sexually explicit, even when there might be a non-pornographic reason to do so, and
even if the website contained predominantly, for example, literary, artistic, or
medical material that would not attract children.  The preciseness of the definition of
material required to be under the “.xxx” domain name might also make a difference,
so that a website that posted sexually explicit material not as pornography but for its
literary, artistic, or medical content, would not be deterred from doing so.
Conclusion.  If a court were to apply “strict scrutiny” to the “.xxx” proposal,
then it appears difficult to predict whether it would be constitutional.  Although it
seems likely that the Supreme Court would find that it serves a compelling
governmental interest, it is not certain whether it would find that it would be the least
restrictive means to serve that interest.  If a court were to apply “content-neutral
scrutiny,” or if the Court were to follow its reasoning in Meese v. Keene, then it
seems likely that it would find the “.xxx” proposal to be constitutional.
